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FAMILY LAW: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
 
Summary 
 
On appeal from an order for termination of parental rights, the Nevada Supreme Court 
held, by a vote of 4-2, that (1) the district court may terminate parental rights notwithstanding a 
completed case plan for reunification if the decision is otherwise warranted under NRS 
§128.105; that (2) the court need not wait a full 20 months to apply the statutory presumptions of 
NRS §128.109(1)(a) and NRS §128.109(2) if a child has been removed from his or her parents’ 
home pursuant to Chapter 32B for at least 14 months of any consecutive 20-month period; and 
that (3) upon application of these rules there was substantial evidence supporting the district 
court’s decision to terminate the appellant’s parental rights based on neglect. 
 
Background 
 
In November 2011, the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) removed 
A.P.M. and E.M.M. from their parents’ home pursuant to NRS Chapter 432B after seven 
incidents of the children swallowing foreign objects while their father was at work and they were 
under their mother’s supervision, including one incident that required surgery. The Department 
was granted legal custody in July 2012 and placed the children in foster care, where they 
remained for approximately 17 months. Their parents, appellant Arli M. and his wife Abigail, 
were issued with case plans to complete as a condition of regaining custody. Arli’s plan required 
him to participate in counseling and attend parenting classes. Arli completed the plan quickly but 
the juvenile court ultimately decided to keep the children in foster care.  
In December 2012, DFS filed a petition for the district court to terminate Arli and 
Abigail’s parental rights. Evidence during the termination hearing showed that Arli took no steps 
to protect his children after any of the swallowing incidents, which he attributed to Abigail 
simply “losing focus” while caring for them. The district court ruled in favor of DFS on the 
grounds that it had established parental fault from neglect and that termination would be in the 
children’s best interest. In rendering its decision, the district court relied on presumptions in 
favor of termination from NRS §128.109(1)(a) and NRS §128.109(2) based on the length of time 
that the children had been removed from home. Both parents appealed, but after Abigail’s 
apparent death her appeal was dismissed. Arli M.’s appeal claimed that (1) he could not be 
denied custody after completing his case plan; (2) that the district court erred in applying the 
statutory presumptions in favor of termination from NRS §128.109(1)(a) and NRS §128.109(2) 
after fewer than 20 consecutive months; and (3) that substantial evidence did not support the 
district court’s ruling. 
 
Discussion 
 
Standard of review 
 
                                                        
1  By Douglas H. Smith 
 Termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that (1) 
termination would be in the best interests of the child and (2) that parental fault exists.2 The 
Supreme Court applies close scrutiny to such orders and will uphold them when they are 
supported by substantial evidence.3 4 This case also involves the interpretation of state statutes. 
The Court reviews statutory construction de novo and when a statute is clear on its face the Court 
will generally not look beyond the plain language to determine legislative intent. 5  Before 
reaching the merits of the decision to terminate Arli M.’s parental rights, the Court must consider 
(1) if the district court can terminate his rights after he has completed a case plan and (2) if the 
court erred applying the presumptions of NRS §128.109(1)(a) and NRS §128.109(2) before a full 
20 months had elapsed. 
 
Completing a case plan for reunification does not prohibit the district court from terminating 
parental rights. 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court disagrees with Arli’s contention that his parental rights 
cannot be terminated because he completed his case plan. A completed case plan “does not 
prohibit the district court from terminating parental rights if termination is otherwise warranted 
under NRS Chapter 128.” Other than parental fault, the primary consideration in proceedings to 
terminate parental rights is whether such a termination would be in the child’s best interest, 
which is determined by the “distinct facts of each case”.6 7 A child’s proper needs for growth and 
development are the decisive factors in these circumstances.8 Although a completed case plan 
may be persuasive that termination of parental rights is not in the child’s best interest, the court 
may still consider additional factors and determine otherwise. Moreover, NRS §128.105 does not 
prohibit the court from finding evidence of parental fault even if parents have completed their 
case plans. Accordingly, the district court was not prohibited from terminating Arli’s parental 
rights even after he completed his case plan.  
 
The presumptions in NRS 128.109(1)(a) and NRS 128.109(2) do not require that a full 20 months 
elapse before they apply. 
 
 NRS §128.109 sets forth presumptions that apply to both the “parental fault” and “best 
interests” factors when the child has been outside of the home. Per the plain language of the 
statute, if the child has been out of the home pursuant to removal under Chapter 432B for at least 
14 months out of any consecutive 20-month period, it is presumed that the parents have 
“undertaken only token efforts to care for the child” and that terminating parental rights would 
be in the child’s best interest.9 10 Arli argues that the court must wait a full 20 months before 
applying these presumptions. The Nevada Supreme Court disagrees. If the 14-month threshold 
has been met, the district court need not wait for the full 20 months to elapse. Here, the children 
                                                        
2 In re Parental Rights as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148 P.3d 759, 762 (2006).  
3 In re Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 795, 8 P.3d 126, 129 (2000). 
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9 NEV. REV. STAT. §128.109(1)(A). 
10 NEV. REV. STAT. §128.109(2). 
were removed for at least 17 months, which satisfies the threshold. The court does not need to 
wait any longer. Accordingly, the district court correctly applied the statutory presumptions of 
NRS §128.109(1)(a) and NRS §128.109(2). 
 
The district court correctly found parental fault based on neglect. 
 
 Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding of parental fault based on 
neglect in this case. Arli argues that he could not have been neglectful because neglect is based 
on how the child is treated while in the custody of the parent and is not established when the 
parent “leaves the child in an environment where the child is known to be receiving proper 
care.”11 Yet by statute, a child is considered neglected when his or her parent refuses to provide 
care that is necessary for the child’s “health, morals, or well-being.”12 Testimony indicates that 
Arli took almost no action to protect his children after repeated swallowing incidents, some of 
which required hospital visits. Arli’s argument fails because, despite his absence from the scene, 
he did not leave his children in an environment where the child is known to be receiving proper 
care.  
 
The district court correctly found that termination of Arli’s parental rights was in the best 
interests of the children.  
 
Arli failed to rebut the statutory presumption that terminating his parental rights was in 
the best interests of his children. Extensive testimony proves Arli’s limited relationship with his 
children. Moreover, it proves that he failed to take protective action for them after seven 
increasingly serious swallowing incidents, incidents that have not reoccurred since the children 
were placed in foster care. The children’s foster parent testified to having a close relationship 
with them after living together for several months and expressed a desire to adopt them. All of 
this evidence together supports the conclusion that it is in the children’s best interest to terminate 
Arli’s parental rights and that Arli is unable to protect his children from danger even after his 
wife’s death. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.   
 
DISSENT by Justice Douglas joined by Justice Cherry: The district court’s original termination 
decision was based primarily on the actions of the children’s mother. In light of her death, this 
case should be remanded for a new hearing as to the children’s best interests and Arli’s parental 
rights 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Because it is only one factor in the ultimate decision, completing a case plan does not 
prohibit the district court from terminating parental rights. The district court was also correct to 
apply the presumptions of NRS §128.109 in favor of termination after fewer than 20 months 
because the children had been out of their parents’ home for approximately 17 months and the 
threshold is 14 months. Arli M. failed to overcome these presumptions because he failed to take 
action to protect his children after repeated incidents involving swallowing foreign objects. The 
judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
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